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Relative Effectiveness  of USDA's  Nonprice
Export Promotion Instruments
Henry W. Kinnucan, Hui Xiao, and Shixue Yu
The USDA's Foreign Agricultural Service funds three types of activities to promote
agricultural exports: consumer promotion, technical assistance, and trade servicing.
These "instruments"  are analyzed  using an adaptation  of Muth's  model.  Results
indicate that consumer promotion always increases the derived demand for the U.S.
agricultural commodity, but that under certain conditions technical assistance and
trade servicing can have a perverse effect. Applying the model to cotton promotion
in Japan, the results suggest that, owing to cotton's modest share of retail value, the
current emphasis on consumer promotion may be misplaced. Specifically, it appears
that producer returns can be enhanced by emphasizing technical assistance projects
that save on the marketing input.
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Introduction
The U.S. Department  of Agriculture  (USDA) funds three types of nonprice export
promotion  activities:  consumer promotion,  technical  assistance,  and trade  servicing
(refer to table 1; see also Henneberry, Ackerman, and Eshleman). Consumer promotion
differs fundamentally from trade servicing and technical assistance in that the former
affects the demand curve for the finished product, while the latter affect, respectively,
the  supply  curve  for  marketing  services  and  the foreign  industry's  farm-retail  (or
marketers')  production function. Although these  distinctions are critical to a proper
assessment of the relative effectiveness  of the three promotional  activities (hereafter
referred to as "instruments"), they have been largely ignored in the scholarly literature.
Accordingly,  the purpose of this research is to determine the relative effectiveness  of
consumer promotion, trade servicing, and technical assistance, taking into account the
precise  way in which  each  instrument  affects  supply  and  demand  in a multistage
production  system.  Specifically,  using  a  model  adapted  from  Muth's  analysis,  and
methods similar to those used by Wohlgenant (1993), we rank the instruments in terms
of their ability to increase the derived demand for the U.S.-origin agricultural input in
export markets.
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Trade Servicing  (TS)
Increase final product demand through brand and generic
advertising,  point-of-sale promotions,  and public relations.
These activities are directed at the final consumer in
importing countries to promote product awareness  and to
influence  consumer attitudes toward U.S. products.
Increase U.S. exports by improving productivity and lowering
cost in intermediate sectors that use U.S. commodity exports
as inputs. Activities include technical and organization
training and transfer of techniques  used in U.S. production
processes.
Provide market and technical information designed to improve
customer relations, maintain current customers in importing
countries,  and create interactions between buyers and sellers.
Activities (e.g., trade teams, consultants, exhibits) are aimed
at the market rather than individual consumers  or producers.
Source: Grigsby and Dixit (p.  5).
Interest in the relative effectiveness issue stems in part from a significant expansion
in federal funding for nonprice export promotion, from $34 million in 1985 to $234 million
in 1992 (Kinnucan and Ackerman, p. 123). Although funding has since declined to about
$120 million (Foreign Agricultural Service), interest in the programs remains high. Export
market expansion plays a pivotal role in the new market-oriented farm policy (Gardner).
McCalla and Valdes argue that the search for new markets for agricultural products has
public-good  attributes,  which implies  that government  subsidies  for nonprice  export
promotion may be welfare increasing. The "green box" designation of nonprice promotion
in the GATT suggests that nonprice promotion may play a more prominent role in trade
and  agricultural  policy (Kinnucan  and  Myrland).  Although  numerous  studies have
analyzed the economic or demand impact ofUSDA's nonprice export promotion programs
(e.g.,  Halliburton  and Henneberry;  Richards  and Patterson;  Solomon and Kinnucan;
Williams), the theory underlying these studies is not well developed.
Following specification of the structural model, the foreign industry's derived demand
curve for the agricultural input is calculated to determine how each instrument might affect
the demand for agricultural commodities from the United States. The model is then applied
to U.S. cotton promotion in Japan in order to highlight principles and to demonstrate the
model's empirical utility. Results suggest that the current emphasis on consumer promotion
in Japan may be misplaced in that technical assistance projects that cause biased technical
change appear to yield much higher returns for U.S. cotton producers.
The Model
Consider a competitive industry in a foreign country that combines  a farm product x
with a bundle of marketing inputs m to produce a retail product q under conditions of
constant returns to scale. Assume that the foreign industry relies on supplies from the
Instrument
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United States for a portion of x. Specifically, let x = xus +  xF, where x  s is the U.S.-origin
quantity, and xF is the non-U.S. or "foreign" quantity.1 The United States can influence
the demand for xus in three ways: through consumer promotions (CP) that increase the
demand for q, through trade servicing (TS) that lowers the cost of m, and through tech-
nical assistance  (TA) that reduces the cost of producing q. The foreign market for x is
assumed  to be  integrated  with the U.S.  market  so that the law of one price  holds.
Specifically,  the price of x net of transfer costs is the same in both markets.
With the foregoing assumptions, initial equilibrium in this industry can be described
as follows:
(1)  q  = f(p, a)  retail demand,
(2)  q  = q(x,  m, t)  farm-retail production,
(3)  Px  = pqx(x, m, t)  demand for factor x,
(4)  Pm  = Pqm(x, m, t)  demand for factor m,
(5)  Xvs  = Xvs(P ) supply of xs,
(6)  XF = XF(Px)  supply of X,
(7)  m  = m(p,  s)  supply of m,
and
(8)  x  =  XU  +  XF  identity,
where p is the price of q, px is the price of x, Pm is the price of m, a denotes expenditures
for CP,  t denotes  expenditures  on TA,  and s  denotes expenditures  for TS.  The  sub-
scripted  terms in  (3)  and (4) denote  marginal physical  products,  i.e.,  qx = aq/lx, and
qm = dq/lm. Notice that whereas CP and TS each affect only one equation in the system,
TA affects three equations (retail supply and the two input demands) owing to its effect
on the marketers' production  function.2
The model  contains eight endogenous variables  (p, Px, P,  q, x, xs,  XF,  and m) and
three exogenous variables (a, s, and t). It generalizes Wohlgenant's (1993) model in that
the price of marketing services is endogenized through the inclusion of a supply equa-
tion for marketing services, and trade is permitted through the inclusion of an import
supply  equation for the agricultural  input. In addition, whereas Wohlgenant  models
reductions in marketing cost as a shift in the marketing services' supply curve, we
extend the analysis to consider improvements  in processing efficiency via shifts in the
marketers' production function.
'With this formulation, we implicitly assume that the agricultural input is homogeneous across supply sources, an assump-
tion that appears to be in line with how the programs operate, at least for the major commodities (Grigsby and Dixit; Spatz).
In situations where product differentiation in the farm-based input is deemed important, Alston and Mullen's model for wool
provides an excellent point of departure (see also Azzam).  For a model involving product differentiation in the finished (or
semi-finished)  good,  see Goddard and Conboy.
2 Holloway develops a model similar to (1)-(8) in which the marketing sector is disaggregated into processing and distribu-
tion sectors. However,  as noted by Wohlgenant  (1993, p. 645, footnote 4), Holloway's model is equivalent to (1)-(8) when the
inputs in processing and the inputs in distribution are weakly separable.
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The best way to model  technical change has been the subject of some debate (e.g.,
Alston, Norton, and Pardey, p. 264). Here we follow Muth's suggestion and model techni-
cal change (induced by TA) as the sum of a "neutral" technical change and an "m-saving"
technical  change. A neutral technical  change is defined by Muth (p. 224) as one that
"increases the marginal physical products of both factors proportionally,  regardless of
the relative proportions employed before the change." Similarly, Muth (p. 224) defines
an m-saving technical change as one that "increases the marginal physical product of
x relative to that of m, but leaves the total output unchanged for the inputs of the two
factors which were used prior to the change."3 Our modeling approach adheres to these
definitions. Shifts in farm supply are not considered in this study because none of the
instruments  affect this curve.
Changes in prices and quantities can be approximated linearly by totally differen-
tiating (1)-(8) and converting to elasticities and relative changes to yield:
(1')  q*  =  -n(P*  - a),
(2')  q*  Sxx* + Smm* +  ,
(3')  * =  -(Sm/)X*  + (S /a)m* +  p*  + p  + Y,
(4')  )  Pm  = (SX/a)x  - (S/o)m* +  p  +3  - (/Sm)Y,
(5')  XUS  = EUSPx,
(6')  XF = eFP,
(7')  Pm  = (1/m)m* - 6,
and
(8')  x*  = kx*s  + (1  - k)x;,
where the asterisked variables refer to relative changes (e.g., p* = dp/p); r is the abso-
lute value of the retail demand elasticity;  Sx (=pxxlpq) and Sm (= pm/pq) are the cost
(revenue) shares for x and m, respectively; a is the Allen partial elasticity of substitution
between x and m; Eus is the supply elasticity for xus; EF is the supply elasticity for XF; Em
is the supply elasticity for m; k (= xus/x) is the U.S. quantity share of x; and a, P, y, and 6
are shift parameters  corresponding to  CP, neutral TA, m-saving TA, and TS, respec-
tively.  [For derivation of P and y in (2')-(4'), see Muth, pp. 224-25.]
In the above model,  all parameters  are defined as positive. Specifically,  the retail
demand curve is downward sloping (-  | < 0), the supply curves for XF and xus are upward
sloping (cus > 0, and eF> 0), the supply curve for m is nondecreasing (em  > 0, or em = °),
and the production function exhibits variable proportions  (o > 0). Similarly, the shift
parameters  are all defined to be positive as follows:
*  a =  relative upward shift in retail  demand due to CP, holding q constant at its
initial equilibrium level;
*  p =  relative increase in marginal products of x and m due to neutral TA, holding
x and m constant at their initial equilibrium levels;
3 Muth used A to denote x, and B to denote m. The quote here and later replaces A with x, and B with m.
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*  y =  relative increase in marginal product of x due to m-saving TA, holding x, m,
and q constant at their initial equilibrium levels; and
*  6  =  relative downward shift in m-input supply due to TS, holding m constant at
its initial equilibrium level.
Analysis
The key relationship for the purposes of this analysis is the foreign industry's derived
demand  curve for xus, which,  by virtue  of the perfect-substitute  assumption,  is
proportional to the industry's derived  demand curve for x. The latter curve, following
Muth's (p.  225)  suggestion,  can be  derived by treating p, as exogenous  and  solving
(1')-(4') and (7') for x* to yield:
(9)  x  - [(roa +  em)/D]p  + [l((o  + em)1D]a + [(  - 1)(o  + em)/D]P
+ [0(1  + em)/D]y  +  [Sm(l  - Go)Em/D]6,
where D =  (em  + SmT l + Sx(), and X =  (Sxrl +  Smo). Since all parameters are defined to be
positive,  D > 0  and  X >  0.  Thus, the coefficient  of p  is negative,  which means  the
industry's derived demand curve for x is downward sloping, as expected.  In fact, if the
supply curve for marketing services is horizontal  (em = o),  the coefficient of p  reduces
to -. , the Hicks-Allen market elasticity of derived demand (Bronfenbrenner).
The coefficients of a, P, y, and 6 in (9) quantify shifts in the derived demand curve as
functions  of model parameters.  From the standpoint  of instrument effectiveness,  the
coefficients  should be positive, i.e., the instruments should cause the derived demand
curve for x to shift to the right. As is evident from (9), this is not always the case. In
particular, the coefficients of P and 6 are ambiguous in sign, which means that neutral
TA and TS may be counterproductive.  In particular, the USDA would not want to fund
neutral TA if the demand for the foreign industry's finished  good was price  inelastic
(rT  < 1). Similarly, the USDA would not want to fund TS if  middlemen can substitute more
easily than consumers such that  <  < a. Muth (p. 226) explains the latter result as follows:4
[A]n increase in the supply of  factor m not only reduces its price and, hence, leads to
a substitution  of factor m for factor  x, but also leads to a downward  shift in the
marginal and average cost curves of all firms and an increase in the supply of the
product. The latter, of course, leads to a fall in price and to an expansion of industry
output. The substitution effect of an increase in the supply of factor m outweighs the
output-expansion  effect on the demand for factor x if o exceeds I1.
By a similar argument, neutral TA is counterproductive  when retail demand is price
inelastic because then the expansion in industry output is not sufficient to offset the
effect of improved factor productivity, causing the demand for both inputs to fall. The
4Technically, Muth's explanation focuses on the effect of an increase in the supply ofx on the demand for m. However,  since
the argument is symmetric,  we took the liberty of interchanging x and m in the quote. In particular (as noted by Alston and
Scobie), if o  > ir, then x and m are gross substitutes,  which means that a reduction in the price of either factor causes the
demand for the other factor to decrease.
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upshot is that care must be  taken when evaluating  TA and TS projects,  since these
projects under certain conditions can have a perverse effect.
Turning to CP and m-saving TA, the coefficients of a and y in (9) are always positive
under the stated assumptions, which means that these instruments always increase the
derived demand for x, and hence for xus  However, since the coefficients of a and y are
not equal, the two instruments in general will have different effects on demand. In
particular,  if a = y,  CP and m-saving TA cause identical increases in derived demand
only if nr  = a. If il >  a [a  situation that holds for beef and veal, pork, and poultry  in
Wohlgenant's  (1989, p. 250) analysis],  CP is always more effective than m-saving TA
when the two instruments  shift the underlying structural relationships by the same
relative amount, i.e.,  a = y.
Further insight into instrument effectiveness can be gained by considering the special
case where the supply of marketing services is perfectly elastic-Wohlgenant's  (1993)
maintained hypothesis. In this case, (9)  simplifies to:
(10)  x'  =  -Ap*  + rna  + (T1  - 1)P  + cy  + S(7  - o)6.
Comparing (9) and (10), it is apparent that the Em = o°  restriction affects the magnitude
of the demand shifts, but not the direction. In particular, the signs of the coefficients of
P and 6 remain ambiguous.  That a plays a pivotal role in instrument choice is evident
from (10). For example, m-saving TA becomes relatively less effective as a - 0, and will
have no impact on demand  if the (aggregate) marketing  technology exhibits fixed
proportions (a = 0). [An example of a fixed-proportions situation may be poultry, since
Wohlgenant's  (1989,  p.  250)  estimate  of a for this industry is not significant.]  Con-
versely, in situations where middlemen can substitute more easily than consumers such
that a > r1 [e.g., eggs, dairy, and fresh vegetables in Wohlgenant's  (1989, p. 250) analysis],
m-saving TA is apt to be more effective than CP, provided the instruments cause equal
percentage shifts in the underlying structural relationships.
In addition to guiding instrument choice, (10),  or (9), can be useful for econometric
analysis. For example, in regressions of xus on p,,  export promotion expenditures, and
other shift variables (as in, inter alia, Halliburton and Henneberry),  care must be taken
in interpreting the regression coefficients for t and s (expenditures  on TA and TS,
respectively),  since they may be positive  or negative  depending  on the absolute  and
relative values of  r and a. Also, aggregating expenditures across instruments-a common
practice in the empirical literature-is ill-advised,  since the aggregation implicitly
assumes that the coefficients of a, t, and s are identical, which in general is not the case,
as is clear from (9) and (10).
Wohlgenant's  (1993, p.  645) analysis indicated that producers would be indifferent
between CP and TS if a = 0, and the instruments are equally efficient in the sense that
an incremental expenditure on each instrument causes the relevant structural relation-
ship to shift by the same absolute vertical distance so that:
a  P = SxY  = Sm5.
This result can be checked by imposing the above restriction on (10) to yield:
x*  =  - P3  + Sqria' +  S0(ri  - 1)P'  + ay  + Sx(r)  - ar6',
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where a' = P' = 6'= y. Comparing the coefficients  of a'  and 6', it can be seen that they
are equal when a = O0.  Thus, our model reproduces Wohlgenant's result. The result, how-
ever, does not extend to TA, which is clearly inferior when a = 0.
Application
To highlight the theoretical findings and to demonstrate the model's empirical utility,
we applied it to cotton promotion in Japan using the baseline data and parameter values
given in table 2.  Cotton promotion in Japan represents a useful case study since the
assumptions underlying the model (integrated world market and homogeneous product
across supply sources) are approximated in this instance. Moreover, cotton has been a
major recipient of USDA funds for nonprice export promotion, and a significant portion
of those monies (41% between 1993 and 1995) has been invested in Japan. The promo-
tion intensity in this market (promotion expenditure divided by export revenue) is 4%,
which is three times higher than the corresponding intensity for the U.S. market.5
Historically, TS and TA activities, funded through USDA's Foreign Market Development
Program, have been the mainstay of the industry's export promotion efforts. However,
with the introduction of the Targeted Export Assistance Program in 1987 (renamed the
Market Promotion Program in 1990, and currently called the Market Access Program)
and the attendant increase in funding, emphasis shifted to CP. Cotton, Incorporated (CI),
the industry's marketing agency,  estimates that about 75% of funds were  invested in
"demand-pull" activities and 25% in "supply-push" activities over the evaluation period
(1993-95). In Japan, the demand-pull (or CP) activities focused on increasing consumer
awareness of the Cotton USA Mark logo, and on reminding consumers of cotton's benefits
as a natural fiber. The supply-push  activities are defined as activities (e.g., consultancy
services, trade fairs, training programs) aimed at middlemen rather than final consumers.
To the extent that such activities lower the acquisition  cost of U.S. cotton,  or improve
technical efficiency in Japan's spinning and weaving operations, they potentially increase
the derived demand for U.S. cotton by increasing the supply of m or decreasing the cost
of q. Accordingly, in this study, supply-push activities are defined as either TS or TA (a
precise delineation is not possible from the available information). At issue is whether the
75/25 allocation can be rationalized in terms of the present model.
Reduced Form
Since we are interested in the net quantity effects, i.e., the effects that take into account
any price changes for x that might be caused by the instruments, we first solved for the
reduced-form equation for px. This was done by setting the derived demand relationship
(9) equal to the following supply relationship:
5 This  estimate is based on data from a Texas A&M University study. That report indicated that the cotton industry
invested $82 million in domestic market promotion and $45 million in research between 1993 and 1995. It also indicated that
domestic cotton marketings were valued at approximately $3.2 billion per year. Dividing $127  million (combined research
and promotion expenditures) by  $9,600  million (cumulative farm revenues  from domestic marketings) gives  a domestic
market "promotion" intensity of 1.32%, which may  be compared to the Japanese-market  promotion intensity of 4%. The
"advertising" intensities-i.e., the intensities that exclude research, TS and TA expenditures-are 0.85% for the domestic
market and 3%  for Japan.
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Table 2.  Baseline Data and Parameter Values,  1993-95
Item  Definition  Value
x  Japan's total mill consumption  of raw cotton fiber (mil. lbs.)  2,524a
XUs  U.S.  exports of raw cotton fiber to Japan (mil. lbs.)  1,358a
k  U.S. quantity share (xus/x)  0.54
Px  Average U.S. farm price of cotton ($/lb.)  0.69a
Pxxus  Export revenue from Japan ($ mil.)  937
A + T + S  Expenditures for cotton promotion in all export markets ($ mil.)  90.7b
a + t +  s  Expenditures for cotton promotion in Japan ($ mil.)  37.lb
aG + tG +  SG  USDA's expenditures for cotton promotion in Japan ($ mil.)  13.0b
t)  ~  Promotion intensity  ((a +  t +  s)/p.xus)  0.040
co  CP's share of total promotion expenditure  in Japan (a/(a +  t +  s))  0.75b
1r  Demand elasticity for cotton products in Japan (absolute value)  0.5,  1.0",  or 2.0
a  Elasticity of factor substitution in Japanese textile mills  0.1 , 0.25d, or 0.49
Sx  Cotton farmers' share of retail dollar  0.05e  or 0.10
Sm  Marketing input suppliers' share of retail dollar  0.95 or 0.90
Em  Supply elasticity for marketing inputs in Japan  20.Oc  or 10.0
EF  Supply elasticity for non-U.S. cotton to Japan  1.6
f or 0.6
f
evs  Supply elasticity for U.S. cotton to Japan  1.1 for 0.3 f
a  Increase in retail price due to CP (%/100)  0.05d
P  Reduction in marketing cost due to neutral TA  0.05
Y  Reduction in marketing cost due to m-saving TA  a/Sr or 0.05
6  Reduction in marketing  cost due to TS  a/Sm or 0.05
Sources:
aUSDA/ERS, Cotton and Wool Yearbook, 1998 (appendix tables 1 and 18); Leslie Meyer, agricultural econo-
mist, Economic Research Service, USDA, Washington DC.
bAllen Beach and Allen Terhaar,  Cotton Council International, Washington,  DC, office.
cAlston and Mullen's value for world wool model.
d Ding and Kinnucan (see text for details).
Don Ethridge, Department of  Agricultural Economics, Texas Tech University, and Sandra Forsythe, Depart-
ment of Consumer Affairs, Auburn University.
f  Derived from Duffy, Wohlgenant, and Richardson's estimate of Japan's excess  demand elasticity for U.S.
cotton (see text for details).
(11)
where e =  keys + (1 - k)eF is the "total" supply elasticity forx obtained by substituting (5')
and (6') into (8').
Solving the resulting equation for p  yields the reduced form:
P(  = [(o  + Em)/D']a + [(11  - 1)(a  + e)/ID']P + [o(  +  m) /D]'Y
+ [Sm(  - )E  ID'
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where D' =  [em()  +  e)  + e(Sml  +  Sxo)  +  tlo] > 0. Since the coefficients of(9) and (12) differ
only by their common denominators D and D', both of which are positive, the instru-
ments' price effects  are in the same direction as the quantity effects. Also, whether an
increase in k (the U.S. quantity share) magnifies or attenuates the price effect depends
on the relative magnitudes of eus and eF. In particular, if  us > eF, then an increase in k
implies a weaker price  effect (since e increases with k when  us > eF, which implies  a
larger supply response to the promotion).  Alternatively,  if cus = eF, the price  effect is
invariant to k.
The instruments' net effects on U.S. exports (i.e., the reduced-form equation for xus)
are obtained by substituting (12) into (5') to yield:
(13)  xus  = [i(o  + em)/D']eusa + [('  - l)(o  + em)/D'  ]US
+ [o(Ti  + em)/D']eusy  + [S,(  - )cm/D']EusS
Equations  (12) and (13) were used to compute the impacts of the instruments on U.S.
producer welfare using the formula:
(14)  APSus  = PxxusPx(1 + 0.5Xs),
where APSus measures the change in economic surplus to U.S. cotton producers.6 Equa-
tion (14)'s validity rests on the assumption that the instruments cause parallel shifts in
linear supply and demand curves, a maintained hypothesis in this analysis. [For a cogent
discussion of the validity  of this assumption,  including drawbacks,  see Wohlgenant
(1999).]
Parameterization
Numerical values used for the parameters in (12) and (13) are given in table 2. For the
baseline analysis,  rq is set to 1.0, the elasticity used by Alston and Mullen in their wool
model. The implicit assumption here is that the demand for cotton products is similar
to the demand for wool  products and that Japanese  demand  is similar to worldwide
demand. Whether this is true depends, inter alia, on Japanese preferences for natural
versus  synthetic  fibers  and  how their preferences  compare  to preferences  in other
countries.  Accordingly, to test the sensitivity of results to this parameter, simulations
are also performed with B alternatively set to 0.5 and 2.0, values that appear to repre-
sent polar substitution possibilities in this market at the retail level.
In the baseline,  a is set to 0.25.  A justification  for this value is that m technically
includes manmade and other noncotton fibers that may be used in the production
process and which would tend to be highly substitutable  for cotton.  In addition,  it is
consistent with the implied value for the U.S. market. In particular, Ding and Kinnucan
estimate the derived demand elasticity for cotton in the United States to be -0.29, which
implies A = (Sxri  + SmO) = 0.29 when em =  o. Setting i'  = 1 and S, = 0.05 (see below) yields
6 Technically,  (14) abstracts from the farm program,  a simplification  that is justified since the relevant features of that
program (the deficiency payment and acreage controls) were eliminated in the 1996 farm bill. (For an analysis of returns with
the farm program, see Ding and Kinnucan.)
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a  = 0.25. If the Japanese and U.S. textile production and retail demand conditions are
similar, a = 0.25 would appear to represent a reasonable value for this parameter. How-
ever, since this is a pivotal parameter in the model, simulations are also performed for
o = 0.1 (Alston and Mullen's value), and for a = 0.49 [the mean value for the six commod-
ities included in Wohlgenant's  (1989, p. 250) study].
The cost-share  parameter S, is set to  0.05 in the baseline,  since discussions with
industry experts indicated this as a "best-guess" value for the United States and there
is little reason to expect that Japan's cost share should be any different. However, since
there is some uncertainty  about this parameter, and Alston and Mullen used a much
higher figure in their wool model (0.3), in our sensitivity analysis we set S, to 0.10, the
experts' upper-bound estimate (see table 2, footnote e). The value for Sm accordingly is
set to 0.95 in the baseline and 0.90 in the sensitivity analysis.
The supply elasticity for marketing inputs is set to em  =  20.0, Alston and Mullen's
value.  In the sensitivity analysis, this parameter  is reduced to 10.0 to determine how
tighter supply conditions in the marketing-input  sector might affect returns.
As for the supply elasticities of cotton into Japan, no estimates exist in the published
literature. However, several studies (e.g., Babula; Duffy, Wohlgenant, and Richardson;
Solomon and Kinnucan) have estimated Japan's demand elasticity for U.S. cotton, which
can be used to derive the supply elasticity for foreign cotton. In particular, Japan's excess
demand curve for U.S. cotton is obtained by substituting the foreign supply curve  (6')
and the derived demand curve (10)  (for simplicity we assume Em  =  oo)  into the market-
clearing condition (8'), which yields:
-[(X  + (1  - k)F)/k]p  + Z
where the term in brackets is Japan's excess demand elasticity for U.S. cotton, and Z
denotes expressions involving the shift parameters that are of  no particular interest here.
Letting Xus = [(X  + (1  - k)eF)/k], and noting that X = (Sx1 + Smo), the supply elasticity for
foreign  cotton can be  derived as a function  of the U.S.  demand elasticity  and model
parameters  as follows:
F  = (kus - Sx  - So)/(l  - k).
Thus, for example, if Xus = 1.9 [Duffy, Wohlgenant, and Richardson's (p. 472) mid-range
estimate for Japan], and the remaining parameters are set to baseline values  (r1  = 1.0,
o  = 0.25, Sx = 0.05, and k = 0.54), then e  =  1.6.
Following a similar procedure, but substituting the supply curve for U.S. cotton (5')
into (8'), yields the corresponding expression for the supply elasticity for U.S. cotton:
eus  = ((1  - k)F - S  - So)/k,
where XF is Japan's demand elasticity for foreign cotton. Since no known estimates exist
for XF, and since Japan imports virtually all of its cotton (about half of which comes from
the United States), for simplicity we set XF  = Aus.  (An additional justification for this
assumption is that cotton is assumed to be homogeneous across import sources.) Thus,
if XF = XUS = 1.9, and the remaining parameters are set to baseline values, then cus = 1.1.
Accordingly, in the baseline simulation,  PF and eus are set respectively to 1.6 and 1.1.
However, to gauge the sensitivity of results to the supply elasticities, we alternatively
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set XF =  4US =  1.0-Duffy, Wohlgenant, and Richardson's estimate of the "total" demand
elasticity for U.S. cotton, i.e., the elasticity that takes into account competitors' reactions
to changes in the U.S. price. In this case, the supply elasticities are EF = 0.6 and cus = 0.3.
Since these latter estimates indicate an inelastic supply response compared to the base-
line, the corresponding simulation may be interpreted  as representing returns over a
shorter time horizon,  say one year or less.
The shift parameter a is set to 0.05 under the hypothesis that CP shifts the retail
demand  curve in the price direction by 5%,  a value that is consistent with Ding and
Kinnucan's estimate for CP of cotton in the United States when diminishing returns are
taken into account. 7 To assign values to the remaining shift parameters, we invoke two
alternative hypotheses. One hypothesis is that the instruments are equally efficient in
the sense defined by Wohlgenant (1993, p. 645). That is, the instruments cause the under-
lying supply and demand curves to shift by the same absolute amount. For a = 0.05, the
equal-efficiency hypothesis implies:
(15a)  p = 0.05,  Y = 0.05/SX,  and  6  = 0.05/Sm.
The alternative hypothesis is that the instruments cause equal relative shifts in  the
underlying  supply and demand curves. This hypothesis implies that:
(15b)  =  =  =6  = 0.05.
Comparing (15a) and (15b), the farmers' share parameter plays an important role in
instrument choice when instruments are assumed equally efficient. For example, when
S, =  0.05, a 5%  shift in retail demand due to CP implies a  100% shift in the x-factor
demand function due to m-saving TA [see (3')]; under the relative shift hypothesis, both
curves shift by 5%. Thus, the equal-efficiency hypothesis tends to favor instruments that
directly affect input markets, a fact that will become clear later.
Instrument Effectiveness
Intuitively, given the importance of marketing inputs in the total cost of finished cotton
products, one would expect that instruments that reduce the need for m in the produc-
tion process, or that improve x's relative efficiency, have an edge. Intuition is confirmed
in the case of equal absolute shifts (table 3). In particular, results indicate that m-saving
TA is the preferred instrument for all considered parameter combinations. For the base-
line simulation, m-saving TA generates a gross welfare  gain to U.S. cotton producers
of $157.6 million, which far exceeds  the gains from CP ($28.5 million) and TS ($21
million). [Neutral TA's surplus gain is zero in the baseline since retail demand is unitary
elastic, implying no effect on derived demand; see equation (9).]
7 This estimate is obtained using the formula a =  pSXaf, where p is the ratio of advertising intensity in Japan to the adver-
tising intensity in the United States, Sx is the cotton farmers' share of the retail dollar, and af is the vertical demand  shift
in the United States measured at the farm level. The farm-level demand shift is equal to the farm-level advertising elasticity
divided by the farm-level demand elasticity. For cotton, Ding and Kinnucan (p. 361) estimated af = 0.066/0.29 = 0.23, which
implies a retail-level demand shift in the United States of 1.72%  (= 0.23  x Sx x  100, where S, = 0.075, the midpoint between
the baseline and the upper-bound estimate). This shift is based on an advertising intensity of 0.85% (see footnote 5). In Japan,
the advertising intensity is 3%, which yields p = 3.5. Assuming that the demand shift is proportional to advertising intensity
(i.e., no  diminishing returns), and both markets are equally responsive  to CP, the implied retail demand shift for Japan is
a = 0.060 (=  3.5 x 0.0172).  To take account of diminishing returns (Simon and Arndt), the estimated shift was reduced to
a = 0.050.
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Table 3.  Instrument-Specific Returns to Cotton Promotion in  Japan for
Equal Absolute  Shifts in Underlying Supply and Demand Curves, 1993-95
U.S. Producer Return per Instrument ($ mil.)b
Neutral  m-Saving
Simulationa  CP  TA  TA  TS  Allc
No.  1  Baseline  28.5  0.0  157.6  21.0  66.0
No. 2  (i = 2.0)  53.7  26.5  153.4  46.2  96.8
No. 3  (r  = 0.5)  14.7  -14.4  159.9  7.2  49.2
No. 4  (a = 0.10)  31.1  0.0  66.1  27.8  46.8
No.  5  (a = 0.49)  25.2  0.0  285.6  12.4  93.4
No.  6  (Sx = 0.10)  27.9  0.0  74.1  20.6  44.6
No. 7  (us  = 0.3;  F  = 0.6)  63.1  0.0  340.8  46.6  144.2
No. 8  (m  = 10.0)  27.6  0.0  158.0  20.1  65.2
Mean  34.0  1.5  174.4  25.2  75.8
Standard Deviation  16.1  11.3  94.9  14.4  34.2
Benefit-Cost Ratiod  0.9:1  0.0:1  4.7:1  0.7:1  2.0:1
a Based on text equations (12)-(14). Baseline simulation uses parameter values: r = 1.0, a = 0.25, Sx = 0.05,
Sm  = 0.95, Eus = 1.1,  F =  1.6, and e m = 20.0.
b Assumes all instruments are equally efficient (see text for details).
Assumes 75%  of funds are spent on CP, and 25% on TA and TS.
d Mean return divided by total promotion outlay of $37.1 million.
The gain from m-saving TA is insensitive to ri  and e,,  but highly sensitive to o, Sx, and
the supply elasticities forx. For example, reducing the supply elasticities to cus = 0.3 and
EF = 0.6 causes the gain to more than double to $340.8 million (simulation 7). Increasing
o from 0.25 to 0.49 causes the gain from m-saving TA to increase to $285.6 million (sim-
ulation 5), while decreasing a to 0.10 causes the gain to fall to $66.1 million (simulation
4). Increasing S, from 0.05 to 0.10 causes a reduction in gain to $74.1 million, still signif-
icantly ahead of CP ($27.9 million), the second-best instrument (simulation 6).
Thus, overstating input substitution or understating x's cost share tends to bias the
analysis in favor of m-saving TA, but not sufficiently to affect choice.  More generally,
although rankings are not affected by the considered parameter values, returns  are,
which suggests that accurate information on ar,  a, S,, cus, and EF is critical for benefit-
cost analysis. (Note that ri  is included in the list since returns to instruments other than
m-saving TA are highly sensitive to this parameter-e.g.,  compare CP's returns in
simulations 2 and 3.) For the considered parameter values a distinct hierarchy emerges,
with m-saving TA dominant,  followed (distantly) by CP, which, in turn, is followed by
TS.
Neutral TA is an inferior instrument in the sense that it generates a welfare loss of
$14.4 million when retail demand is price inelastic (simulation 3). [The instrument is
inferior when rj < 1 because then (ri  - 1)  < 0 in equation (12), which means that neutral
TA causes p, to fall.] If demand is elastic,  a gain of $26.5 million is realized, but it is
modest in relation to the gain from m-saving TA ($153.4 million), and is substantially
less than the gain from CP and TS (simulation 2). Thus, projects that cause neutral
technical change should be avoided altogether.
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Mean gross returns for the eight simulations are $174.7 million for m-saving TA, $34
million for CP, and $25.2 million for TS (table 3). Weighting these returns by the budget
allocation (75% to CP and 25% to TA and TS) produces a gross gain of $75.8 million and
a benefit-cost (B-C) ratio of 2.0:1. Thus, under the maintained hypothesis that a = 0.05
and the instruments are equally efficient, it appears that the cotton promotion program
in Japan was profitable.  However,  a different instrument mix would have resulted in
a larger net return. In particular, by placing more emphasis on m-saving TA (B-C ratio =
4.7:1), and less on CP (B-C ratio = 0.9:1), it should be possible to improve profitability.
How do the results in table 3 compare with Wohlgenant's (1993) findings? First, they
are consistent in that CP always dominates TS (compare our table 3 with Wohlgenant's
tables 2-5). Second,  although Wohlgenant did not explicitly analyze technical change,
his result that farm-level  production research  dominates  CP  is consistent with  our
result that m-saving TA dominates  CP. 8In particular, as noted by Wohlgenant (1993,
p. 645, footnote 3), m-saving TA is tantamount to a simultaneous reduction in the cost
of the farm input and a decrease in retail demand. Since a reduction in retail demand
and an increase in farm supply have opposite  effects  on producer welfare (assuming
parallel shifts in linear curves, the maintained hypothesis), the fact that m-saving TA
dominates CP in table 3 simply means that the gain from the (implied) increase in farm
supply is large relative to the loss from the (implied) decrease in retail demand.
Both sets of results rely on the assumption that the instruments are equally efficient,
i.e., cause equal absolute shifts in supply and demand. What if we assume instead that
the instruments cause equal percentage shifts? As can be seen in table 4, the effect is
dramatic. In particular, CP replaces m-saving TA as the dominant instrument. Moreover,
TS moves to second place, except when input substitution is relatively elastic (a = 0.49),
in which case m-saving TA is slightly more effective than TS (simulation 5).
The reason for the preference reversals is not hard to discern. In particular, as noted
earlier, the equal-efficiency hypothesis favors instruments that affect input markets by
implying larger percentage shifts in these markets than in the output market. This is
especially true in instances where the cost share for the affected market is small. For
example, in the present case where S, = 0.05, a 5% increase in retail demand implies a
100% increase in x-factor demand under the equal-efficiency hypothesis. This accounts
for the some 20-fold difference in returns for m-saving TA reported in tables 3 and 4.
Returning to table 3, the mean overall B-C ratio of 2.0:1 excludes returns to non-U.S.
cotton suppliers, and thus understates total producer benefits. "Foreign" producers supplied
46% of Japan's raw cotton fiber needs over the evaluation period, and since cotton is
assumed to be fungible across supply sources, it follows that these producers captured
benefits in proportion to their market shares.9 Including free-rider benefits would inflate
the B-C ratio by 1.85 (=  1/0.54) to 3.7:1, which is below the B-C ratios of between 5.4:1
and 6.0:1 reported by Capps et al. for domestic market promotion when benefits are
measured at the mill level. However, it compares favorably with the estimates reported
by Ding and Kinnucan (p. 363) for the total promotion program (domestic and export
market promotion) when the benefits of demand  shifts accrue to U.S. taxpayers  via
lower outlays for deficiency payments.
8Wohlgenant's (1993) analysis, like ours, rests on the assumption that the instruments cause parallel  shifts in the under-
lying supply and demand curves. If the curve shifts are nonparallel, a different ranking emerges (Chung and Kaiser).
9More precisely, this statement is strictly true only if supply response  across supply sources is equal. Specifically, foreign
producer benefits are measured by APSF =PXFP;(l +  0.5  ).  Comparing this equation with (14), the proportionality statement
holds only if x*  =  x's,  which implies eF  = e.  In the present case, since SF> 
8US,  the adjusted B-C ratio given below is understated.
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Table 4.  Instrument-Specific Returns to Cotton Promotion in  Japan for
Equal Relative  Shifts in Underlying Supply and Demand Curves, 1993-95
U.S. Producer Return per Instrument ($ mil.)b
Neutral  m-Saving
Simulation'  CP  TA  TA  TS  AllP
No.  1  Baseline  28.5  0.0  7.3  19.9  28.2
No. 2  (r  = 2.0)  53.7  26.5  7.1  43.9  59.7
No. 3  (I  = 0.5)  14.7  -14.4  7.4  6.8  11.0
No. 4  (a = 0.10)  31.1  0.0  3.2  26.3  30.7
No. 5  (o = 0.49)  25.2  0.0  12.5  11.8  25.0
No. 6  (Sx = 0.10)  27.9  0.0  7.1  18.5  27.3
No. 7  (eUS  = 0.3; eF= 0.6)  63.1  0.0  16.2  44.3  62.5
No. 8  (em  = 10.0)  27.6  0.0  7.3  19.1  27.3
Mean  34.0  1.5  8.5  23.8  33.9
Standard Deviation  16.1  11.3  4.0  13.8  17.8
Benefit-Cost Ratiod  0.9:1  0.0:1  0.2:1  0.6:1  0.9:1
Based on text equations (12)-(14). Baseline simulation uses parameter values: rl = 1.0, a = 0.25, Sx = 0.05,
Sm  = 0.95, Eus = 1.1,  F = 1.6, and Em  = 20.0.
b Assumes equal percentage shifts of 5% in the underlying supply and demand curves (see text for details).
Assumes 75% of funds are spent on CP, and 25% on TA and TS.
d Mean return divided by total promotion outlay of $37.1 million.
Optimal  Allocation
The analysis thus far suggests that returns to cotton promotion in Japan could have
been increased by investing relatively more in m-saving TA and relatively less in CP.
To sharpen these results, and to indicate how the framework can be used to identify an
optimal set of government policies with respect to cotton promotion in Japan, we invoke
the principle that the budget allocation is optimized  when the last dollar invested in
each instrument increases the market price for cotton by the same amount, so that:
ap  /aa  = apx /at  = apx /atB  = apx  as,
where the as yet undefined variables tN and tB are expenditures, respectively, for neutral
and m-saving  (biased) TA. 10 The above condition applies when all instruments  are
non-inferior, which is true when ri 2  1 and  _  2C  a (case 1). If  r  < a, TS is inferior and the
10  That quantity effects are irrelevant to the allocation  decision can be seen by examining the first-order conditions of the
optimization problem
max 7  = pXxus  - fx  S-l(xus) dz  - (a +  tN +  tB  +  s),
a,t,s  °  0
where n is U.S. producer surplus net of the cost of promotion (or "profit"), and S 1  is the excess supply curve for U.S. cotton
written in inverse form,  i.e.,  price as a function  of quantity in equation  (5).  Thus, for example,  the first-order condition
corresponding  to CP is ad/aa =  0, which implies that (apx/aa)xu 5 +px(dxus/aa) - S  (xus)(axs/aa)  - 1 =  0. Noting that px =
S-~(Xs), the second and third terms cancel, leaving (apx/da)xus = 1.  Thus, only the price effect matters. In particular, if the
budget is unconstrained, investment in CP is optimized when the last dollar invested yields exactly one dollar in additional
export revenue,  i.e., d(pxs)/da =  1. A similar expression  obtains  for each of the remaining instruments. Equating these
expressions yields the text's optimality condition.
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Table 5. Optimal Budget Allocations When Instruments  Are Equally Efficient
(percent)
OPTIMAL ALLOCATION  WHEN:
T>  1 and  > c  r>l  1 and r <a  o  <1 and  >o  a  < 1 and r <a
Instrument  (Case 1)  (Case 2)  (Case 3)  (Case 4)
------------------------  Formulas-----------------------
CP  Sri(o +  em)/A  Si(a + m)/l'  Sx(o + m)/OI"  Sx(a +  cm)"'
Neutral TA  Sx(  - 1)(o +  em)/(  Sx(  - 1)(o + m)'  -a  a
m-Saving TA  o(r  +  £m)/I  o(nr  +  em)l'  o(rl + m)/l"  o(rl +  Em)l'
TS  S,(1 -)em/D  a  Sx(-aO)m/  "  a
-------------  Results for Cotton Promotion in Japan  -------------
Baseline:b
CP  0.20  NA  0.09  NA
Neutral TA  0.10  NA  0.00  NA
m-Saving TA  0.53  NA  0.87  NA
TS  0.17  NA  0.04  NA
All  1.00  NA  1.00  NA
a = 0.10:
CP  0.28  NA  0.17  NA
Neutral TA  0.14  NA  0.00  NA
m-Saving TA  0.31  NA  0.69  NA
TS  0.27  NA  0.14  NA
All  1.00  NA  1.00  NA
Notes:  0  =  SxT(o  +  em) +  Sx(r  - l)(o +  Em)+ o(  + m) +  Sx(ir  - o)Em,
¢'  =  Sl(a +  em) +  Sx(T  - l)(o +  em) +  o('  +  em),
D" =  Sxl(a +  Em) +  o(rl +  em)  +  Sx(r - o)em,  and
¢"'  =  Sxl(o +  em) +  o(r  +  em).
a  Instrument has perverse effect, and thus is deleted from the choice set.
b Based on parameter values:  Sx =  0.05, a = 0.25, ec  = 20.0, vi = 2.0 (case 1), and q = 0.5 (case 3).
condition is modified by deleting apx/as (case 2). Similarly, if  < 1, neutral TA is inferior
and apX/atN is deleted (case 3). The final possibility is that r  < 1 and it < o, in which case
both apX/atN and apx/as are deleted (case 4). The optimization rules for each case in terms
of model parameters  (derived in the appendix) are  provided in table  5.  These rules
assume that instruments are equally efficient, a maintained hypothesis.
From table 5, only four parameters govern the allocation decision: r,  o, Sx, and em.
Since rl > a in the present  analysis, TS is never inferior, which means that cases  1
and 3 apply.  In the simulations,  we  set o, S,, and  em  to baseline  levels, and ir to
extreme  values  (0.5  and  2.0),  since  these results  suffice  to indicate  the general
pattern. However, to assess how allocations might be affected in a short-run situation
where input substitution possibilities are limited, an additional simulation is provided
with a set to 0.10.
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Results show m-saving TA receiving the largest budget share for all considered
parameter  combinations (table  5).  However,  allocations  are  sensitive to the demand
elasticity.  For example, in the baseline with a = 0.25,  the allocation  to m-saving  TA
increases  from 53%  to 87% as rj  decreases from 2.0 to  0.5. If a =  0.10, m-saving TA's
share increases from 31% to 69% as ir decreases to 0.5. Thus, accurate information about
the retail demand elasticity is crucial to allocation decisions.
As a - 0, allocations even out, especially when retail demand is elastic. For example,
in the extreme  case where  'i = 2.0  and a  = 0.10,  the optimal budget shares for CP,
m-saving TA, and TS differ by only a few percentage points from 29% (table 5, case 1).
In this case, as in the others, neutral TA is the least preferred instrument, garnering at
most 14% of the budget. Overall, CP's budget share never exceeds 28%, which suggests
the current allocation of 75% to demand-pull promotions and 25% to supply-push
promotions is inefficient.  [In simulations with a = 0.49 (not shown), CP's share is less
than 14%.] Specifically, results suggest that a 25/75 allocation is about optimal when
instruments are equally efficient, which is opposite the actual allocation.
Concluding Comments
The basic theme of this research is that producers and USDA program managers should
not be indifferent about the allocation  of funds to  consumer promotion, technical
assistance, and trade servicing. Our analysis, based on an adaptation of Muth's model,
suggests that trade servicing and technical assistance in particular need to be evaluated
carefully, since under certain conditions these instruments can have a perverse effect.
Key to instrument selection is knowledge of retail demand and input-substitution
elasticities for the promoted commodity in the target market. For example, if retail
demand is price inelastic, which might be true for many agricultural commodities,
especially when "total" demand elasticities are considered (Buse), technical assistance
projects that cause neutral technical change  should be avoided altogether, since they
may cause the derived demand for the agricultural commodity to decrease. Similarly,
if middlemen can substitute more easily than consumers (a > fl),  which appears to be
true for eggs, dairy, and fresh vegetables in the U.S. market (Wohlgenant 1989, p. 250),
trade servicing projects should be avoided, since they would tend to decrease the derived
demand for the agricultural input.
Few rules-of-thumb beyond these can be extracted from the analysis except perhaps
for the intuitive idea that cost shares can be important to instrument choice. For example,
for agricultural commodities like cotton or wheat, where marketing inputs account for
the bulk of the cost of the finished good (e.g., jeans and bread), activities that lower the
relative cost of the marketing input (e.g., by causing m-saving technical change) may be
more effective than direct demand promotion. In the more usual case where agricultural
input cost shares  are relatively large (say 0.3 or  above), and retail  demand is more
elastic than input substitution (ri  > o), our analytical model suggests that the preferred
instrument in general will be consumer promotion. Thus, the trend toward emphasizing
consumer  promotion in USDA's  budget allocations  (Mackie) has some theoretical
support.
The theoretical analysis highlights the need for careful record keeping on the part of
program managers. In particular, expenditures on the various instruments should be
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kept separate to enable researchers  to obtain unbiased estimates of program impact.
(Such record keeping does not appear to be standard practice at present.) Since some
instruments  are  supply  shifters  and others  are demand  shifters  in the  underlying
structural model, and not all instruments have a clear positive effect on derived demand,
aggregating the expenditures in general will lead to specification error. This is a point
that researchers need to keep in mind when specifying econometric models and inter-
preting regression coefficients based on data aggregated over the instruments.
[Received September 1999; final revision received February 2000.]
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Appendix:
Derivation of Optimality Conditions
Consider first the case where all instruments are non-inferior. In this case, allocations are optimized
when the following condition is satisfied:
apx/aa = appatN  =  apat  = apx/as.
Rewriting the condition in elasticity form yields:
(Al)  (px)/a*)/a® = (p/t~)/t  = (pi/t  )/t  = (ps)/s,
where j  (j  = a, tN, tB, s) denotes the expenditure on thejth instrument that maximizes "profit" (see text
footnote 10), and the terms in parentheses are reduced-form  elasticities. The reduced-form elasticities
from text equation (12) are defined as follows:
(A2a)  Px/a* = [r(o + e)/D']a,
(A2b)  P*/tk  = [(rT  - 1)(o  + e)/D']P,
(A2c)  pjl/t  = [a(1  + E  )l/D'y,
and
p/s* 
= [Sm(fl  - o)em/D']6.
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Substituting (A2) into (Al) and imposing the equal efficiency condition  {a  = P = Sxy  = S  6} yields the
optimality condition in terms of model parameters:
(A3)  Sr (o  +  em)/a®  =  S(  - 1)(o  +  )  =  + e)/t  = Sx(n -o)Em/s.
Equation  (A3) is expressed  in terms of expenditure  ratios. To express  the condition  in terms  of
expenditure (or budget) shares, define
Kj  i®/U®,
where KJ  is thejth instrument's share of the total promotion budget inprorofit-maximizing  equilibrium.
Thus, for example, CP's optimal budget share is:
=  (a®  +  t  +  ts +  s')  =>  1/K  =  1  +  t/a®  +  ta  +  s®/a®.
Ka  aN  +a  N  B  +
Making the appropriate substitutions from (A3) into the above expression yields:
(A4)  K  = S ,r(a + em)/(,
where (I is the sum of(A3)'s numerators as defined in text table 5. Equation (A4) indicates CP's optimal
budget share when all instruments are equally efficient and non-inferior. Corresponding  expres-
sions for the remaining instruments are derived in a similar manner and are given in text table
5, column  1.
If an instrument is inferior, as is true for neutral TA when i| < 1, and for TS when -r < o, the opti-
mality condition must be adjusted  to take into account the reduced  choice set. This is accomplished
simply by deleting the expression corresponding to the inferior instrument from (Al) [or, equivalently,
(A3)], and recomputing the optimal budget share as just described. Text table 5 provides the complete
set of formulas  for all possible choice sets.
Kinnucan, Xiao, and Yu